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Victims' "Rights" or a Fair Trial Wronged?
CHRISTOPHER R. GODDU*
The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect
their processes from prejudicial outside interferences.1
INTRODUCTION
The victims'2 rights movement has grown in force since the
early 1970s.1 The movement seeks to balance the criminal justice
system's concern for the defendant with its concern for the victim4 by
affording victims a greater role in the criminal process.5 This goal is
* J.D. Candidate, University at Buffalo School of Law, May 1993. The author thanks
Christopher M. Marks, Henry Nowak, Darin A. Bifani, Madeline Henley, Charles Ewing,
and Lisa Pirozzolo.
1. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
2. "Victims" as used throughout this Comment includes the immediate family and
relatives of the victim. See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 937, 951-52 (1985) (discussing society's perception of who is a victim).
3. See THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE, VICTIM RIGHTS AND
SERVICES: A LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY 1985 [hereinafter NOVA DIRECTORY]; Frank
Carrington & George Nicholson, The Victims' Movement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come,
11 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1984) (symposium issue); Robert C. Davis & Madeline Henley, Victim
Service Programs, in VICTIMS OF CRIME: PROBLEMS, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 157 (Arthur
J. Lurigio et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter CRIME VICTIMS] ("[T]he growth of service
programs [for victims] in the United States has been nothing short of phenomenal.").
Some commentators have noted that the victims' rights movement has progressed faster
than any other civil rights movement. See, e.g., Curtis J. Sitomer, New Civil Rights
Thrust: Aid for Victims, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 5, 1983, at 1.
4. See PRESIDENTS TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT vii (1982)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT] ("The neglect of crime victims is a national disgrace. The
President is committed to ending that neglect and to restoring balance to the administra-
tion ofjustice."). Professor Henderson has noted that:
The success of these groups concerned with particular crimes and crime victims
served to highlight the general importance of "victims" as an effective political
symbol. Conservatives thus began rhetorically to paint "the victim" as a sympa-
thetic figure whose rights and interests could be used to counterbalance the de-
fendant's rights, and called for a new balance to be struck by courts and legisla-
tors.
Henderson, supra note 2, at 949.
5. Anderson and Woodard have noted that:
Specific reforms include measures designed to protect victims and witnesses
from intimidation, notify victims of designated occurrences in the proceedings,
provide for victim participation in some proceedings, encourage employers not
to discharge testifying employees, provide ombudsmen or support companions
for victims, and guarantee victims the right to a speedy disposition of their cases.
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grounded in the belief that victims have rights equivalent to those of
the defendant.6 Some advocates for victims' rights have even pro-
posed the following addendum to the Sixth Amendment:
Likewise, the victim, in every criminal prosecution shall have the right to
be present and to be heard at all critical stages ofjudicial proceedings.
7
This increased emphasis on victims' rights and involvement of
the victim in the criminal process will cause a range of problems,
including the potentially prejudicial role that victims, and victim
advocates, may play in criminal trials.' Examples of this behavior in
the courtroom include: the victim or victim's family sitting at the
counsel table with the prosecutor during the trial,9 victim/witness
advocates accompanying witnesses to the witness stand,"0 and vic-
tim/witness advocates escorting prosecution witnesses in and out of
the courtroom."
The problems that arise from the victims' rights movement are
rarely discussed, and any discussion that does occur is one-sided. 12
The reason for the one-sided discussion is that the two normally
combative ideological foes-the liberal left (in the persona of the
feminist movement in this instance) and the conservative right-
share a common goal in this debate: protection of victims. Because
both "sides" desire the same goal, the means to and consequences of
achieving the goal are left unscrutinized, and honest evaluation of
any new victims' rights programs or legislation does not occur." This
John R. Anderson & Paul L. Woodard, Victim and Witness Assistance: New State Laws
and the System's Response, 68 JUDICATURE 221, 228 (1985).
6. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, Constitutional Considerations: Government Responsi.
bility and the Right Not to be a Victim, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 63 (1984) (symposium issue).
7. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 114. But see James M. Dolliver, Victims' Rights
Constitutional Amendment: A Bad Idea Whose Time Should Not Come, 34 WAYNE L. REV.
87 (1987), for an argument that an addendum to the Sixth Amendment is problematic and
misconstrued. See generally Symposium, Perspectives on Proposals for a Constitutional
Amendment Providing Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System, 34 WAYNE L.
REV. 1 (1987), for further discussion on the proposed addendum.
8. Throughout this Comment, any reference to "trial" refers to the guilt/innocence
phase rather than the sentencing phase of a trial, which involves separate victims' rights
considerations.
9. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-14-53 (1983) (granting the victim the right to be seated at
the counsel table of the prosecutor); see also infra part III.B.1.
10. See, e.g., State v. Suka, 777 P.2d 240 (Haw. 1989); see also infra part III.B.2.a.
11. See infra part III.B.2.b. (discussing this phenomena).
12. See Henderson, supra note 2; Dolliver, supra note 7. These are the only two
major articles that criticize elements of the victims' rights movement.
13. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 951 (arguing that the ideological right asserts
the same goal as the ideological left, granting victims' rights, in order to coopt the left); cf
Wendy Kaminev, Feminists Against The First Amendment, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov.
1992, at 110 (arguing that both feminists and the religious right are pushing the view
that pornography is not speech, thereby limiting the usual debate in which these two
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lack of debate and discussion can lead to a trial environment where
it is possible to subtly undermine a defendant's constitutional rights.
This Comment discusses the problems that the victims' rights
movement creates at trial. While victims should be given special
consideration outside the courtroom by virtue of their status as vic-
tims, they should not be afforded extra consideration or rights
within the courtroom during a criminal trial. Although the phrase
"victims' rights" may suggest that victims have special or additional
rights, this Comment argues that victims have no greater rights
during a trial than any other citizens. At trial, the rights under
which all other rights must be subsumed-including victims'
rights-are the defendants' constitutionally guaranteed rights to a
fair trial and an impartial jury.
This Comment explores the victims' rights movement's effect,
through legislation and the increasing courtroom presence of vic-
tims, on the rights of defendants. Defendants' rights are being over-
looked and ignored in the emotionally charged rush to help victims,
or, as some argue, in the rush to convict defendants.'4 During a
criminal trial, defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial
and an impartial jury 5 should override the rights of victims if they
conflict. Victim service programs 16 that do not involve the victim in
the trial most appropriately meet victim needs. Excessive participa-
tion by victims or their advocates at trials unfairly denies defen-
dants their Sixth Amendment rights by injecting emotion and
prejudicial bias into the criminal process's search for the truth.
Part I of this Comment examines the origins of the victims'
rights movement. Part I1 discusses defendants' Sixth Amendment
rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury. This section illustrates
how courts have found that defendants' Sixth Amendment rights
may outweigh others' constitutional rights and interests in order to
ensure a fair trial, focusing on the guidelines that courts use to
balance defendants' Sixth Amendment rights with the public's First
opposing views engage).
14. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 951.
15. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. For a discussion of programs and services for victims, see PETER FINN & BEVERLY
N.W. LEE, SERVING CRIME VICTIMS AND WITNESSES (1987). For a guide to victims' rights,
see JAmES H. STARK & HOWARD W. GOLDSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIS (an ACLU
Handbook) (1985).
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Amendment rights of access.to trials and expression. Part III argues
that the guidelines used to balance defendants' Sixth Amendment
rights with the public's First Amendment rights provide a model for
balancing victims' and defendants' rights at trial. This section first
provides examples of how victims' rights may violate defendants'
constitutional rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury and then
applies First Amendment guidelines to determine the extent of
permissible victim participation in trials.
I. THE VIcTIMS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT
A. The Birth of Victims'Rights
Prior to the victims' rights movement, the criminal justice sys-
tem inadequately responded to the desire of victims to participate in
the trial of their assailants, as well as to the victims' desire for retri-
bution.17 This led to a decreasing level of participation by victims
and witnesses"5 and, consequently, fewer convictions.' 9 The victims'
rights movement responded to a widely held feeling that the victim
had been forgotten by the criminal justice system.2"
Citizens had "a growing feeling of impotence-a feeling that the
authorities cannot relieve the problem and that there is little or
nothing that the rest of us can do."2' The women's movement articu-
lated and publicized these feelings, 2 focusing on rape and how a
17. See Carrington & Nicholson, supra note 3, at 1-10; Josephine Gittler, Expanding
the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 117, 121 (1984) (symposium
issue); Paul S. Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice System: Time For A
Change, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 23, 26-27 (1984) (symposium issue).
18. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MYTHs AND REALITIES ABOUT CRIME (1978);
Davis & Henley, supra note 3.
19. ROBERT C. DAVIS, THE ROLE OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS IN AN URBAN
CRIINAL COURT 2, 9 (1988).
20. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at vi. ("Somewhere along the way, the
system began to serve lawyers and judges and defendants, treating the victim with insti-
tutionalized disinterest."); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims' Rights
Movement, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 517, 523 (1985); William F. McDonald, Towards a
Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 649, 650 (1976); Robert Ward, A Kinder, Gentler System: An Examination of How
Crime Victims Have Benefitted From the Women's Movement, 15 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 171, 172 (1989) ("Victims were treated as if they were invisible or ir-
relevant.").
21. Betty J. Spencer, A Crime Victim's View on a Constitutional Amendment for
Victims, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 2 (1987); see also Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role
of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MISS. L.J. 515 (1982).
22. See, e.g., Davis & Henley, supra note 3, at 159 ("The first grass-roots programs
were established between 1972 and 1976. Of the first three, all begun in 1972, two were
rape crisis centers that grew out of the impetus of the women's movement."); Gittler, su-
pra note 17, at 118 ("Much of the initial impetus for this movement stems from concern
about rape victims generated by feminists and women's organizations .... ."); Deborah P.
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woman is "twice victimized" by the criminal justice system in a rape
trial.' In response, many states enacted Rape Shield Laws,' which
fulfilled the victim's desire and need to participate in the trial with-
out being put on trial. Additionally, the movement sought to address
victims' perceived need for retribution.'
Congress responded to the victims' rights movement by enact-
ing the Victim/Witness Protection.Acte s in 1982 and the Victims of
Crime Act (VOCA)2 in 1984, providing protection for victims and
funding for state compensation programs and victim/witness assis-
tance agencies. Thus, on the federal level, victims and witnesses
instantly achieved a newfound status in the criminal justice sys-
tem.
Kelly, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System, in CRIME VICTIMS, supra note
3, at 172 ("As recently as the early 1970s, attention to crime victims was virtually
nonexistent. Efforts to change this were initiated by feminists... ."). See generally
Gilbert Geis, Crime Victims: Practices & Prospects in CRIME VICTIMS, supra note 3, at
251, 255 ("National political developments were largely responsible for moving the subject
of victims of crime onto the stage, center front, in the United States").
23. Robert Ward has noted:
Today, in the Victims' Movement, we are concerned with the problem of secon-
dary victimization. Unfortunately, this occurs when a victim seeks help from
friends and/or from law enforcement, and is again victimized because he or she
is treated badly. Who was it that taught us about the problem of secondary vic-
timization? It was the Women's Movement and in particular, the victims of rape
and sexual assault.
Ward, supra note 20, at 173-74. Shirley Abrahamson has commented:
The early voices were frequently feminine and their tones were more those of
anger than of fear. Their concern was for a particular victim, the victim of rape.
The advocates sought to humanize treatment of the rape victim and to free the
criminal justice system of sex role stereotypes which frequently resulted in
blaming the rape victim for the crime.
Abrahamson, supra note 20, at 524. See also Gittler, supra note 17, at 118 n.4; SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975).
24. By 1986, 48 states had enacted Rape Shield Laws. See Harriett R. Galvin,
Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 906-07
(1986).
25. For a discussion of society's call for retribution, see Henderson, supra note 2, at
990-99. "One meaning of retribution is associated with a theory of moral blameworthiness
that justifies punishment. Although what constitutes appropriate punishment is both
morally and culturally determined, the guiding notion is that defendants must pay a
'debt' to society to make amends for their wrongs." Id. at 990-91.
26. The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515, 3579-3580 (1988)).
27. Federal Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10605 (1988)).
28. See Davis & Henley, supra note 3, at 157 ("Thanks, in part, to federal funding
through the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA), victim service programs have developed a se-
cure niche for themselves both within and outside the criminal justice system."). VOCA
spent $100 million in 1986 and its funding limit was increased to $150 million in 1988.
Robert Elias, Which Victim Movement? The Politics of Victim Policy, in CRIME VICTIMS,
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States followed the lead of the Federal Government and soon
initiated changes of their own. By 1984, thirty-nine states had en-
acted victim compensation legislation. 9 Additionally, numerous
states had enacted victim/witness protection statutes, 0 which in-
cluded provisions for "ombudsman or support companions for vic-
tims."3 1 Some states went so far as to.enact victims' "bills of rights."3 2
Victims' rights had come of age but had not been fully and clearly
defined.
B. What are Victims' Rights?
The victims' rights movement successfully identified important
areas of concern for crime victims-compensation, assistance in
supra note 3, at 226, 233.
29. See Anderson & Woodard, supra note 5, at 222. As of October, 1992, 47 states and
the District of Columbia had compensation programs. See ALA. CODE § 15-23 (1992);
ALASKA STAT. § 118.67.010 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2407 (1992); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-90-701 (Michie 1990); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13961.3 (West 1992); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-4.1-100.1 (1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-201 (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
9002 (1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-401 (1992); FLA. STAT. ch. 775.089 (1992); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-15-1 (Michie 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 351-2 (1991); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301
(1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 72 (1992); IND. CODE § 12-18-6-1 (1992); IOWA CODE §
912.1 (1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7317, 74-7332 (1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.010
(Baldwin 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:571.7 (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, § 1321 (West 1991); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 640 (1992): MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258A, § 1
(1991); MICH. COMvP. LAWS § 18.351 (1992); MINN. STAT. § 611A.64 (1992); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 99-41-1 (1991); Mo. REV. STAT. § 595.045 (1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-101
(1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2280 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 217.001 (1991); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:4B-1 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-1 (Michie 1992); N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15B-1 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.11 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §
192.3 (1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.101, 147.005 (1991); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 180-7
(1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25-1 (1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1180 (Law Co-op. 1991);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-28B-1 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-101 (1992); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1 (West 1992); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12
(West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-63-1 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5353 (1992); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.1 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.120 (1991); W. VA. CODE
§ 14-2A-2 (1992); WIS. STAT. § 949.01 (1990); WYO. STAT. § 1-40-101 (1992).
30. See Anderson & Woodard, supra note 5, at 229. By 1985, twelve states had
enacted legislation to deal with victim and witness protection: Alabama, Arizona,
Colorado, California, Delaware, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nevada,
Illinois, and New York. For a more detailed analysis of these statutes, see id.
31. Id. at 228.
32. As of October, 1992, 17 states had victims' Bills of Rights. See ARIZ. CONST. art.
2, § 2.1 (1992); CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28 (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9401 (1992); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1403 (1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7333 (1992); MICH. CONST. art.
1, § 24 (1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 21-M: 8-K (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-24-1 (Michie
1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.405 (1991); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 180-9 (1992); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-1510 (Law. Co-op. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-101 (1992); TEX. CONST.
art. 1, § 30 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-37-1 (1991); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (1991);
WIS. STAT. § 950.01 (1990); WYO. STAT. § 1-40-201 (1992).
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participating in the system, restitution, and protection- from intimi-
dation.3 The criminal justice system was compelled to respond to
those needs because without victim cooperation the system would
lose a key component in obtaining convictions and combatting
crime-the victim's testimony. Consequently, state legislatures
granted rights to victims, attempting to make victims feel needed by
and important to the system.3 These rights included, most promi-
nently, the right to "participate in the criminal justice system."5
The right to "participate" seems general and broad. Victim par-
ticipation means affording the victim protection, knowledge of the
proceedings, and input into some prosecutorial decisions."
Participation, however, does not necessarily create trial rights for
the victim, 7 and thus the extent of the victim's permissible partici-
pation is unclear.
States with victims' bills of rights 8 have established guidelines
for victim participation in the criminal justice system. Normally the
victim is granted the right:
1. To be informed of the final disposition of the case;
2. To be notified if any court proceeding for which they have received a
subpoena will not occur as scheduled;
3. To receive protection from victim intimidation and to be provided
with information as to the level of protection available;
4. To be informed of the procedure for receiving witness fees;
5. To be provided, whenever practical, with a secure waiting area not
close to where the defendants wait;
6. To have personal property in the possession of law enforcement
agencies returned as expeditiously as possible, where feasible,
photographing the property and returning it to the owner within ten
days of being taken;
7. To be provided with appropriate employer intercession so that loss of
pay and other benefits resulting from court appearances will be
minimized.3 9
While these guidelines provide a great deal of much needed atten-
tion to victims and their concerns, they do not mention permitting a
victim to participate in or influence a defendant's trial. In other
33. See STARK& GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 3-4.
34. Id. at 22.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Victims are sometimes allowed to participate in plea bargains, pretrial proceed-
ings, and parole hearings. Id. at 58-82.
37. The proposed addendum to the Sixth Amendment would theoretically create trial
rights for the victim. But, as Judge Dolliver points out, "[a]ny rights the victim seeks to
secure are not of a constitutional character; thus, a victims' rights amendment is an inap-
propriate means of securing victims' rights." Dolliver, supra note 7, at 91.
38. See supra note 32.
39. STARK& GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 23.
1993]
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words, the very framers of victims' bills of rights assumed that vic-
tims could be made to feel safe and enfranchised in ways which did
not involve their intrusion on defendants' trial rights. However, the
victims' rights movement has demanded greater victim protection
than found in the bills of rights, attempting to elevate the status of
the victim to the level of the defendant.40
C. The Jurisprudential Window of Opportunity for Victim's
Rights: From Warren to Rehnquist
The Warren Court4' brought about drastic changes in the
constitutional interpretation of criminal procedure and defendants'
rights.42 Many scholars view this period as the zenith of liberal judi-
cial activism in criminal justice.43 The Court broadened protections
for defendants and enforced limits on state power more strictly.
44
Placing limits on police power provided a means for protecting indi-
vidual freedom.45
Philosophically, the Warren Court perceived society and its
deficiencies as the root cause of crime.46 To punish individuals for
crime partly caused by society seemed unjust to the liberal ideology.
The liberal ideology thought that sanctions should focus on rehabili-
tation, not retribution.47 Focusing the criminal justice system
squarely on defendants and rehabilitation would force society to
40. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
41. Earl Warren served as Chief Justice from September 1953 to May 1969.
42. See generally LiA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICs (1983); ALEXANDER
BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT (1965); PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970); Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for
Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 518.
43. Justification for such a view rests on the two dozen or so "important" criminal
law decisions rendered by the Warren Court. See Allen, supra note 42, at 520 n.8 (listing
the important decisions); KURLAND, supra note 42 (analyzing the Warren Court's
ideology).
44. By this time, our criminal justice system had firmly embraced the theory of
public prosecution. For an analysis of the trend from private to public prosecution, see
Henderson, supra note 2, at 938-42. With this dominant view came a need for greater re-
view of state action, for abuse of freedom was seen as more likely in a state where the po-
lice were granted more power-or so the Warren Court believed. At least one scholar has
argued that this belief arose from our lessons with European dictators. "One can safely
assume that some public officials, including judges, were led to view the regulation of
criminal justice functions not as a matter of local concern, but rather as part of the
essential strategy of freedom." Allen, supra note 42, at 522; see also FRANCIS A. ALLEN,
THE CRIMES OF POLITICS 4 (1974).
45. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 42; KURLAND, supra note 42; Allen, supra note 42.
46. See, e.g., Ronald Bayer, Crime, Punishment, and the Decline of Liberal Optimism,
27 CRIME & DELINQ. 169, 172 (1981).
47. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL
POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981).
[Vol. 41252
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confront the causes of crime.4
Society's concern with defendants' rights and belief in rehabilita-
tion did not, however, lead to a decline in the crime rate.49 As more
Americans became victims of crime, a call for retribution, not reha-
bilitation, reverberated through the Supreme Court, Congress, and
the country. 0 Following Warren Burger's replacement of Earl
Warren as Chief Justice, Richard Nixon appointed William
Rehnquist to the Supreme Court, and conservative ideology gained
its foothold in the judiciary.-' The Warren Court's era of defendant's
rights had ended, and the pressures of politics, racism, and fear con-
trolled. 2
The conservative movement criticized the failure of liberal
ideology to deal with crime. It responded to the nation's call for ret-
ribution afid incarceration 3 with the "Crime Control Model. "54 This
48. The causes of crime throughout this period were seen as alienation, poverty,
discrimination, and lack of education. Henderson, supra note 2, at 943; see also Bayer,
supra note 46, at 171-72. Society turned introspective and shouldered this liberal,
ideological burden when it answered John Kennedy's call to "ask not what your country
can do for you-ask what you can do for your country." Inaugural Address of John F.
Kennedy, 1962 PUB. PAPERS 1, 3 (Jan. 20, 1961).
49. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at vi; see also STARK & GOLDSTEIN, supra note
16, at 1; JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 4-5 (1975); Goldstein, supra note 21,
at 515.
50. See SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1989) ("Richard
Nixon made the Supreme Court a major issue in his campaign for the presidency in 1968.
In an attempt to appeal to voters by emphasizing law and order, he blamed decisions of
the Warren Court for high rates of crime and little punishment."). The social upheaval in
the late 1960s fed a growing fear of the breakdown of the public order. See Henderson,
supra note 2, at 947-48; see also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1988)); FRED P. GRAHAM,
THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970); RICHARD HARRIS, THE FEAR OF CRIME 22-29 (1969).
Liva Baker asserted that:
The man who had criticized Miranda [Warren Burger] had replaced the
man who had written it [Earl Warren]. There was an empty seat at the extreme
right, still another opportunity for the president who had campaigned against
Miranda. Perhaps most important of all, for the first time all three branches of
government, the Congress, the president, and finally the judiciary, were now
lined up against Miranda.
An era as well as a term had ended.
BAKER, supra note 42, at 287.
51. See DAVIS, supra note 50; see also DONALD E. BOLES, MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST,
JUDICIAL ACTIVIST (1987).
52. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 943-46.
53. Lois Forer explained:,
Reluctantly we must acknowledge that we simply do not know how to treat vio-
lent dangerous offenders so that they can be 'cured' of violence, unreason, and
hostility. Until such time as there are developments in psychotherapy, chemis-
try, and medicine, the legal system will have to isolate these people who pose an
unreasonable risk to society. For them, prison is the only appropriate penalty.
LOIS G. FORER, CRIINALS AND VICTIMS 305 (1980). For a view that our nation is return-
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conservative break from the .Warren Court's liberal ideology mani-
fested itself in a number of tough sentencing laws passed during the
1970s5 5 and led to a growing number of victims groups established in
the late 1970s and early 1980s.56 While the Supreme Court was cut-
ting back defendants' rights, these victims groups were publicizing
victims' rights." The efficacy of these groups stemmed from their
-political power at the national and state level."
The goals of the victims' rights movement are subject to de-
bate. 9 Although advocates of victims' rights agree on the importance of
victim participation in the criminal justice system,6" their justifica-
ing to vigilantism to deal with the failures of the rehabilitation approach of the Warren
Court, see RALPH A. FINE, ESCAPE OF THE GUILTY (1986).
54. The Crime Control Model "envisions a summary process, much like an assembly
line, with reliance placed on administrative rather than judicial decisionmaking. Central
to the ideology of the crime control model are the 'presumption of guilt' and the belief
'that the criminal process is a positive guarantor of social freedom.'" Henderson, supra
note 2, at 946 (footnotes omitted). For a detailed analysis of the Crime Control Model, see
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-173 (1968).
55. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 947 n.62.
56. For example, Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD) was founded in 1980 and
Parents of Murdered Children was founded in 1978. Henderson, supra note 2, at 950 n.76.
Additionally, Students Against Drunk Drivers (SADD) was founded in 1981. Barry
Tempkin, SADD Idea Has Happy Outcome, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 1990, at C24. See also
Spencer, supra note 21, at 5 (describing a coalition formed in 1987 called Victims'
Constitutional Amendment Network, including eleven victims' groups: NOVA, Sunny von
Bulow National Victim Advocacy Center, MADD, Parents of Murdered Children,
Childhelp USA, Protect the Innocent Victims Advocate Foundation, Justice for Crime
Victims of America, Justice for Surviving Victims, Victims of Crime Advocacy League,
Crime Victims Committee of the American Bar Association, and Campaign California).
57. See, e.g., Ted Gest et al., Victims of Crime, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 31,
1989, at 16; Martha Middleton, Victims of Crime Flexing Muscles: Bigger Role Wanted,
NAT'L. L.J., Mar. 13, 1989, at 1; Curtis J. Sitomer, Judges Assemble From Across U.S. to
Discuss the Rights of Crime Victims, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 28, 1983, at 1; Curtis
J. Sitomer, Shedding the Stigma of False Accusations, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 25,
1985, at 23; Nick Thimmesch, A Family's Fight for Justice, SATURDAY EVENING POST,
Dec. 1984, at 42.
58. This power was obtained through a political paradox. No politician in his right
mind would vote against victims' rights legislation. To object to victims' rights would
imply a lack of concern for his constituents, for anyone can be a victim of crime, and this
impression could foster a belief among his constituents that he was "soft on crime." Most
people do not see themselves as defendants, but rather as victims. Thus, no one could po-
litically oppose victims' rights. The voices of victims rose, while defendants lost their voice
to this new political wave. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 952-53.
59. Some participants in the debate argue that the movement pushes for a reconsid-
eration of the "objectives of criminal justice." Goldstein, supra note 21, at 518. Others ar-
gue that the movement is a "cooptation of victim's concerns by crime control proponents."
Henderson, supra note 2, at 1020.
60. See Carrington & Nicholson, supra note 3, at 9; Paul S. Hudson, The Crime
Victim and the Criminal Justice System: Time For a Change, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 23, 35
(1984) (symposium issue); Deborah P. Kelly, Delivering Legal Services to Victims: An
Evaluation and Prescription, 9 JUST. SyS. J. 62, 72 (1984).
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tions for participation vary.61 Regardless of these justifications, the
success of the victims' rights movement in increasing community
awareness of the criminal justice system has led to a participatory
revival.
The remainder of this Comment argues that the numerous pro-
grams for victim/witness protection and participation have eroded
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and an impartial
jury. Once victims are granted "participation" in certain areas of the
criminal justice process (i.e., victim impact statements, parole hear-
ings and plea bargains), they feel entitled to a role in the trial itself.
Such participation is unnecessary because state and federal pro-
grams that do not directly affect the trial adequately protect vic-
tiMs. 62 Victim participation in the trial, however, is more than re-
dundant; it violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by inject-
ing emotion and prejudice into the trial. 3
II. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
AND IMPARTIAL JURY
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee all criminal
defendants, in both state and federal courts, the fundamental rights
to a fair trial and an impartial jury.6 The Supreme Court has de-
termined that the basic components of a fair trial include a pre-
sumption of innocence6 5 and the principle that "one accused of a
crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on
the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of
official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circum-
stances not adduced as proof at trial."66 It is important that the
61. Many victims' rights advocates recognize victims' need for retribution, but they
also note victims' need for closure, equality in the system, and recognition that they were
not responsible for their victimization. See, e.g., Deborah P. Kelly, Victims' Perceptions of
Criminal Justice, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 15 (1984) (symposium issue); Dean G. Kilpatrick &
Randy L Otto, Constitutionally Guaranteed Participation in Criminal Proceedings for
Victims, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 7 (1987). However, Professor Henderson argues that the
movement's push for participation, and thus a voice, has been perverted into a tool to en-
hance conviction rates. Henderson, supra note 2, at 951.
62. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
63. See infra part III.B. for examples of such effects.
64. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in all criminal cases is
made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
65. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S.
432,453 (1895).
66. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978). See also Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that a fundamental component of fair trial due process
requirements is that jurors reach a verdict based on the evidence presented in open
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public tribunal demanded by the Sixth Amendment be "free of
prejudice, passion, excitement, and tyrannical power."67 Without
these safeguards, the presumption of innocence so crucial to a
criminal trial would be meaningless. Due process requires that any
activity that may pose "a threat to the 'fairness of the factfinding
process'.., be subjected to 'close, judicial scrutiny.'"'68
Courts should safeguard the trial process; they should prevent
the jury from seeing or hearing anything that would prejudice a
defendant's ability to receive a fair trial. For example, one potential
threat to the fairness of a criminal trial is the presence of an object
or activity that may create racial or emotional prejudice. Sometimes,
jurors may not even be aware of the introduction of prejudice to the
trial environment or the subtle impact that the prejudice may have.
Awareness of the impact of the activity or object, however, is not the
issue. Rather, the prejudice may merely be inherent: 9 'The question
must not be whether jurors actually articulated a consciousness of
some prejudicial effect, but rather whether 'an unacceptable risk is
presented of impermissible factors coming into play.'
70
A. An Analysis of the Fair Trial Standard in Conjunction With
First Amendment Fundamental Rights
Courts use certain guidelines to balance fundamental rights.
For example, guidelines have been applied by courts to balance de-
fendants' Sixth Amendment rights and the First Amendment right
of access to criminal trials. Courts have not, however, developed
guidelines to balance defendants' Sixth Amendment rights and vic-
tims' rights. This section attempts to uncover guidelines for courts to
use in balancing defendants' Sixth Amendment rights and victims'
rights by examining the guidelines established in other areas. Part
III then applies, by analogy, those guidelines to victims' rights.
1. Access to the Courtroom. The First Amendment guarantees
the right to attend criminal trials 7' absent any "overriding inter-
court). -
67. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940).
68. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 564, 568 (1986) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501, 503-04 (1976)); see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133 (1955).
69. See Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that for the defen-
dant "to prevail on his claim of being denied a fair trial, he must either show actual or in-
herent prejudice" (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)); Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that proof of actual prejudice is not necessary to deny a defendant a
fair trial; inherent prejudice is sufficient).
70. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. at 511, (quoting Estelle v Williams, 425 U.S. at 505).
71. Victims, like all other citizens, have a First Amendment right to attend criminal
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ests." 2 Overriding or balancing interests include, most importantly,
a defendant's right to a fair trial.7 This right to a fair trial often
competes with other parties' First Amendment right of access. In
these cases, the potentially prejudicial effect of the exercise of the
right of access must be balanced against the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial.'4
One area where the right to. access has been limited is in ex-
cluding the press from the courtroom. In order to bar the press from
the courtroom, the defendant must show "that closure is required to
protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial. 7 5 While there
must be "a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused,"76 a
showing of actual prejudice is not needed."'
Supreme Court case law tips the balance of these two compet-
ing rights in the courtroom toward the defendant. The Supreme
trials. Victims, however, are usually called as witnesses and are thus excluded from the
courtroom by rules of evidence. Thus, their right to access is essentially denied. This ex-
clusion should undergo the proposed balancing test illuminated in Part III. Application of
the test will most likely allow for victims to remain in the courtroom after they have testi-
fied if it can be shown that they will not be needed again.
72. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (noting that
"[tihe presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on
findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values"); see also Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982) (holding that the right to attend
criminal trials is trumped only by a compelling state interest); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) (stating that "absent an overriding interest
articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public").
73. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (holding that '[w]hile maximum freedom
must be allowed the press in carrying on this important function [of covering trials] in a
democratic society its exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute
fairness in the judicial process").
74. See, e.g., Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501; Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 564 (noting that the conflicts between the First
Amendment right of access and a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial "are
almost as old as the Republic" (quoting Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547
(1975)); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (noting that "the presence of the
press at judicial proceedings must be limited when it is apparent that the accused might
otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged"); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (holding that
television cameras should have been excluded from the courtroom because the televising
of the defendant's trial violated his right to a fair trial); Mares v. United States, 383 F.2d
805 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 963 (1969) (discussing the need to ac-
commodate both Sixth Amendment interests and First Amendment interests); see also
Joseph F. Kobylka & David M. Dehmel, Toward a Structuralist Understanding of First
and Sixth Amendment Guarantees, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 363 (1986) (discussing these
competing rights).
75. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 564.
76. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 542.
77. See id. at 542. Justice Clark notes that "[tihere is little wonder that the defen-
dant cannot 'prove' the existence of such [prejudicial] factors. Yet we all know from expe-
rience that they exist." Id. at 547.
78. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 539 (stating that the conduct and activities of the
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Court has held that if an exercise of First Amendment rights is in-
herently prejudicial to the defendant, then that practice should be
eliminated from the trial.79 Any practice with a probability of un-
fairness is inherently prejudicial and should be prevented. 0
By finding that a practice is inherently prejudicial, courts have
in essence balanced First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights.
The defendant's right to a fair trial is weighed against First
Amendment rights of speech and access. If the balance tips toward
the defendant, the court has essentially reasoned that there is an
unacceptable risk of unfairness and can then either exclude the
media or take measures to eliminate the prejudicial conduct.
The Supreme Court has stated that prejudicial conduct can be
limited, short of denying access, through the use of judicial orders
that control the atmosphere of the courtroom." In Sheppard v.
Maxwell, the Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights were violated by the carnival-like atmosphere in the court-
room.8 2 Reporters inside the bar, which the trial judge permitted,
were particularly disruptive. 3 The Sixth and First Amendment
interests involved in Sheppard could have been balanced easily. The
judge, the Court concluded, could have easily controlled the situ-
ation by enacting strict rules governing courtroom decorum.4 Access
press in the courtroom are "subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial
process"). But cf Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596. In Globe
Newspaper Co., the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that required judges to
exclude the media and the general public from the courtroom during the testimony of a
minor victim of a sex offense. The majority saw the state interest of protecting the victim
as minor to the fundamental First Amendment right of access held by the media and the
public. However, in dissent, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist felt the statute
had "relatively minor incidental impact on First Amendment rights and gives effect to the
overriding state interest in protecting the child rape victims." Id. at 619-20.
79. See, e.g., Turner v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (holding that the
conduct of two deputy sheriffs who testified at trial, were present with the jury in and out
of the jury room, and guarded the jury was prejudicial and necessitated reversal); Rideau
v. State of Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (holding that the taping of a confession by the
defendant and the televising of it prior to voir dire necessitated a new trial); see also
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 366 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that
"[fin securing freedom of speech, the Constitution hardly meant to create the right to in-
fluence judges or juries").
80. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1954) ("Fairness of course requires an
absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored
to prevent even the probability of unfairness.").
81. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 358.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. The Sheppard Court held that:
The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been avoided since the court-
room and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court. As we
stressed in Estes, the presence of the press at judicial proceedings must be lim-
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is a fundamental right; overrunning or disturbing the courtroom is
not.85
When a court balances the First Amendment rights of the press
with the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, procedures that ac-
commodate the rights of both parties are the most desirable.
Consequently, courts rarely deny access to the courtroom during a
trial. Instead, courts limit, or should have limited, prejudicial con-
duct through court orders that preserve both parties' constitutional
interests. 6
2. Expression in the Courtroom: Buttons. In addition to access
to the courtroom, the First Amendment also protects freedom of ex-
pression. However, some courts have held that wearing buttons as a
form of expression in a courtroom violates a defendant's right to a
fair trial.8 In State v. Franklin,'m the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals held that the wearing of buttons in the courtroom by
members of MADD and a uniformed sheriff "constituted a formida-
ble, albeit passive, influence on the jury."89 The Franklin court
concluded that the presence of the MADD spectators and the uni-
formed police officer undermined the defendant's right to a fair
trial.9 0 The uniformed sheriff and spectators wearing buttons re-
quired a balancing test between the defendant's rights and the pub-
lic's right of access.91 In balancing the two interests, the Franklin
court determined that this conduct could have irreparably under-'
f
ited when it is apparent that the accused might otherwise be prejudiced or dis-
advantaged.... The number of reporters in the courtroom itself could have
been limited at the first sign that their presence would disrupt the trial. They
certainly should not have been placed inside the bar. Furthermore, the judge
should have more closely regulated the conduct of newsmen in the courtroom.
Id. at 358 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
85. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. at 366.
86. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(stating that "expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions"); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 358
(evaluating the right of the press to be within the bar during trial); Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (barring television cameras from courtroom for reason of prejudice); see also
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) (holding that a judge has discretionary power to
forbid media coverage whenever he is satisfied that such coverage will effect the
defendant's right to a fair trial).
87. See Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990); State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d
449 (W. Va. 1985).
88. 327 S.E.2d 449 (prosecuting defendant for felony murder for driving under the
influence of alcohol and causing the death of another driver).
89. Id. at 455. Of importance to the court was the fact that the MADD spectators
were "clearly distinguishable from other visitors in the courtroom." Id.
90. Id.
91. "[WMe are concerned that the right of public access to a criminal trial be coordi-
nated with the constitutional right of a defendant to a fair trial." Id. at 455.
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mined the defendant's right to a fair trialY2
The Franklin Court couched its consideration of the case in
terms of the right of access, while actually examining the right of
expression. 3 Finding unacceptable the wearing of buttons in the
courtroom by the sheriff and the MADD spectators,94 the court sug-
gested that remedial orders by the .trial judge would have allowed
both the right to a fair trial and the right of access to coexist harmo-
niously.'5 The court failed, however, to suggest any specific court-
room remedies.
Any form of expression that may implicate Sixth Amendment
rights can be limited by a court.9 6 Consequently, refusal to obey
court orders (i.e., to remove buttons) could force a court to deny ac-
cess to the proceedings in order to guarantee the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial.97
In Norris v. Risley, the Ninth Circuit also found button wearing
during a trial to be inherently prejudicial conduct.9" Such First
92. Id.
93. In contrast, the 9th Circuit found explicitly that buttons were intended to convey
a message. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828. The same conclusion should have been
explicitly articulated in Franklin, for it is apparent the buttons could have no other
purpose then to convey a message of guilt. The Franklin court even implied this
conclusion by stating that the MADD spectators were "tooth and nail opposed to any find-
ing that the defendant was not guilty." State .v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d at 455.
94. "This court quite simply cannot state that the mere presence of the spectators
wearing MADD buttons and the pressure and activities of the uniformed sheriff leading
them did not do irreparable damage to the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial
jury." State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d at 455.
95. "Ihe court's cardinal failure in this case was to take no action whatever...."
Id.
96. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
97. A court has similar authority to deny access when a defendant refuses to obey
court orders. A defendant has a right to be present at every stage of his trial. Lewis v.
United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1842). However, that right is not absolute. The Supreme
Court has held that "there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial
judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keep-
ing him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he
promises to conduct himself properly." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970).
A court's decision to bind and gag a defendant in order to maintain the integrity of
the trial and to make it possible for the defendant to remain present could be seen as ac-
tually undermining a fair trial and thereby denying a defendant his fundamental rights.
See id. at 344. But it has been established that where the trial process is jeopardized, the
rights to the party responsible for placing it in jeopardy may be abridged. See id. at 346-
47. In the face of a court order, both a defendant and a holder of a First Amendment right
have the choice of either desisting from the conduct which undermines the trial process or
losing a right (i.e., the right to freedom from prejudicial conduct at trial, such as being
bound, or the right to access to the trial).
98. 918 F.2d 828. Robert Lee Norris was tried for kidnapping and sexual intercourse
without consent. Id. at 829. During his trial, some members of the Billings Rape Task
Force and the National Organization for Women wore "Women Against Rape" buttons. It
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Amendment expression compromised the presumption of the defen-
dant's innocence. 99 The Norris court found that spectators, relying on
their First Amendment rights, intended to convey a message by
wearing buttons. However, this First Amendment right of expres-
sion, while important and fundamental, did not outweigh the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial.100 "[W]hen balancing these competing
rights the issue is not whether the buttons posed a serious and im-
minent threat to life, but whether they posed such a threat to a fair
trial. If so, the first amendment interests must bow to the constitu-
tional right to a fair trial."10' The court stated that the environment
created by the button-wearing spectators may have impermissibly
bolstered the credibility of prosecution witnesses.102
The most troubling aspect of the trial in the Norris case was the
ease with which the trial court could have avoided the prejudicial
conduct through a judicial order. 0 3 As the Norris court stated, "the
burden of alleviating the risk [of an unfair trial] was minimal,"
0 4
implying that asking spectators to remove their buttons would have
been a proper courtroom order.
Apparently, Norris establishes that trial spectators have a
right to attend trials, but not to advocate views in a manner which
potentially would compromise the fairness of trials. A right to advo-
cate on behalf of the victim during the trial infringes upon the de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and, as the Norris
court held, "the importance of a fair trial outweighs spectators' first
amendment rights."105 Since the "actual impact of a particular prac-
tice on the judgment of jurors cannot always be fully determined,"'
and the potentially prejudicial practice serves no compelling First
Amendment interest (i.e., right of access or right to information),
then the practice should be avoided when the burden of doing so is
minimal.
The button cases, Norris and Franklin, differ from the First
Amendment newspaper access cases.'0 7 Access to information, rather
is this conduct the court found objectionable. Id. at 831.
99. "[T]he buttons' message, which implied that Norris raped the complaining wit-
ness, constituted a continuing reminder that various spectators believed Norris' guilt be-
fore it was proven, eroding the presumption of innocence." Id. (footnote omitted).
100. Id. at 832.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 833.
103. See id. at 834.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 832.
106. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976).
107. In the access cases,
the individuals asserting first amendment rights claim the right to receive in-
formation. [In Norris,] some trial spectators sought a far broader and more ac-
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than the right to advocate, was the key issue in the press cases.'
Although the press, in the newspaper cases, did not seek to commu-
nicate facts or opinions directly to the jury, the jury may have been
tainted by the media coverage. However, the Norris and Franklin
courts were presented with an intent to convey a message of guilt-a
much more direct form of prejudicial conduct. Thus, it was more
likely that a prejudicial message would be conveyed to the jury in
the button cases. These two ends of the spectrum, intent to convey a
message of guilt and concern with dissemination of information,
must both be balanced against a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights. An intent to convey guilt, however, is clearly more serious
because that type of conduct will almost always create an unaccept-
able risk of compromising a defendant's ability to obtain a fair trial.
Thus, conduct exhibiting an intent to convey a message of guilt
should be regulated or banned.
B. State Conduct That is Prejudicial to a Fair Trial
"Information dissemination" and "intent to convey a message of
guilt" occupy different ends of the "prejudicial conduct" spectrum.
Often, state conduct is involved in the trial. State conduct which
falls near the "intent to convey a message of guilt" end of the spec-
trum should always be found to be inherently prejudicial because of
the irreparable harm it would cause to a defendant's ability to ob-
tain a fair trial. State conduct which falls near the "information
dissemination" end of the spectrum may also create an unacceptable
risk because such activity is subjected to stricter scrutiny when the
prejudicial activity is conducted by state officials. If conduct is ulti-
mately found to be prejudicial, it should be permitted only upon,
first, a showing of a compelling state interest, 09 and second, a bal-
ancing of the interests served by the conduct and the defendant's
interests. Absent a compelling state interest, the possibility of the
tive role, to make a statement about Norris's guilt. No case has been cited to us
for the proposition that trial spectators have a constitutional right to advocate
trial outcomes in the courthouse.
Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d at 833 n.5.
108. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Nebraska
Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1975); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
109. A compelling state interest includes an essential state policy, like protecting the
courtroom from the defendant, guarding against the escape of the defendant, or, as this
Comment discusses, increasing victim participation in the system. The use of a
compelling state interest to allow inherently prejudicial conduct has, thus far, been ap-
plied only to state conduct. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). Where non-
state conduct has been inherently prejudicial, no compelling state interest could permit
such behavior. See, e.g., Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 831 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting
that the preservation of First Amendment protections by permitting the wearing of but-
tons by spectators was not a compelling state interest).
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state's conduct tainting a defendant's fair trial should not be toler-
ated, regardless of the state benefits that might otherwise be derived
from letting the conduct stand.
1. The Presence of Uniformed Police Officers in the Courtroom is
Justified When There is a Compelling State Interest. The Supreme
Court has said that any type of state behavior that threatens the
"'fairness of the fact finding process'.., must be subjected to 'close
judicial scrutiny."110 In Holbrook v. Flynn,"' six co-defendants were
tried and normal courtroom security procedures called for a twelve-
man security force. Due to a shortage of regular courtroom .security
personnel, four uniformed state troopers sat in the front row of the
spectators' section during the trial. Applying its standard of "close
judicial scrutiny,""' the Court upheld the actions of the trial court in
permitting the troopers' presence.13 The Court first reasoned that
the presence of a security force in the courtroom was not inherently
prejudicial."' The Court then determined that the presence of the
troopers did not constitute actual prejudice." 5 Because a determina-
tion was made that the state's conduct was not inherently or actu-
ally prejudicial, the Court did not reach the question of whether the
conduct served a compelling state interest. However, the Court
noted in dicta that even if the state conduct was impermissibly
prejudicial, the state's legitimate interest in maintaining custody of
the defendants would justify the troopers' courtroom presence."'
Two important points can be distilled from Holbrook. First, the
Court held that the wide range of inferences that could be drawn
from the officers' presence necessitated a case-by-case analysis of
whether the presence of a security force is inherently prejudicial."
Second, "even were [the court] able to discern a slight degree of
prejudice attributable to the troopers' presence at respondent's trial,
sufficient cause for this level of security could be found in the State's
need to maintain custody over defendants.""'
Holbrook states that different inferences can be drawn from a
particular courtroom procedure."' Some inferences would be preju-
110. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1976).
111. 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
112. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. at 504.
113. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. at 572.
114. Id. at 569.
115. Id. at 571.
116. Id. at 571-72. But see Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the presence of up to twenty uniformed police was not a necessary policy in a trial for
the murder of a prison guard in a town that was heavily tied to the prison industry).
117. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. at 569.
118. Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 569.
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dicial to a fair trial, others would not. The Holbrook Court held that
a case-by-case analysis must be utilized to decide the issue in ques-
tion.' O In order to find that a practice is inherently prejudicial, a
court must find that "an unacceptable risk is presented of impermis-
sible factors coming into play."' 2'
When the court's first point-that prejudice in each case is
-decided on the facts of that case-is considered with the courts
second point-that a slight degree of prejudice can be overcome by a
substantial state interest-it becomes apparent that the case-by-
case analysis established by Holbrook is actually a consideration of
the probability of prejudice in light of the importance of the state
interest. The greater the state interest, the greater the probability of
prejudice must be to ban the state conduct. If, as Justice Marshall
states, a slight degree of prejudice can be overcome by a sufficient
state interest, then it follows that the same slight degree of preju-
dice cannot be overcome by an insufficient state interest.
A court's finding that a particular type of conduct is inherently
prejudicial is followed by a further inquiry into the state interest. If
there is an essential state interest, then the court must balance it
against the inherent prejudice and the possibility of the prejudicial
conduct or object tainting the trial.'2 2 Conversely, if the state has no
compelling interest in the inherently prejudicial practice, then any
probability of taint is too great and the state's practice should be
prohibited.
III. A FAIR TRIAL AND "VICTMS' RIGHTS"
The impact of the victims' movement on the criminal justice
system has encouraged victim participation at trial. While the valid-
ity of this participation can be argued,"' courts should ensure that
participation, at the very least, does not infringe on defendants'
Sixth Amendment rights. The pivotal determination is the standard
to be used to determine victims' status at trial. A victim's interest in
the trial should not be raised to the level of a new constitutional
120. Id.
121. Id. at 570 (quoting Estelle v. William, 425 U.S. at 505).
122. Holbrook implies that a compelling state interest (i.e. safety or maintaining the
integrity of the trial) is more important, at the trial level, then First Amendment
interests. A practice protected by the First Amendment that is at all prejudicial must be
eliminated, while a practice justified by a state interest undergoes a balancing. The prac-
tice furthering the state interest may create a risk of prejudice, but the risk of prejudice
can be outweighed by the strength of the state interest.
123. See Symposium, Victims' Rights, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1984); Symposium,
Perspectives on Proposals for a Constitutional Amendment Providing Victim Participation
in the Criminal Justice System, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1987). But see Henderson, supra
note 2.
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right." Rather, the victim's right to participate in a criminal trial
should be defined by victims' First Amendment rights to access. 2
A. Victims Do Not Have the "Right" to Prejudice or Taint the Trial
There is no Constitutional basis for the concept of "victims'
rights."26 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant many
rights at trial, but it does not guarantee any rights to victims. 27 Any
push for an addendum to the Sixth Amendment that would allow
victims the same or similar trial rights as defendants is a misread-
ing of the Bill of Rights and would be inconsistent with the goals of
the Sixth Amendment. 2 8 By "emphasizing the conflict between the
victim and the accused and placing the victim in the role of a quasi-
prosecutor or co-counsel, the victims' rights amendment represents a
dangerous return to the private blood feud mentality.
" 129
As criminal justice evolved, state prosecutions replaced private
actions.10 The state, in order to fulfill its contract with its citizenry,
undertook all prosecutions.'3 ' Criminal defendants were guaranteed
rights under the Sixth Amendment in order to avoid state oppression.
124. See Dolliver, supra note 7.
125. See supra notes 75-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the right of
access. For the sake of argument, the author allows the assumption that "victims' rights"
are equivalent to First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has actually held victims'
rights to be less compelling than First Amendment rights. See Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (holding that a Massachusetts statute that required
judges to exclude the media and the general public from the courtroom during the
testimony of a minor victim of a sex offense violated the fundamental First Amendment
right of access held by the media and the public).
126. Professor Doliver has commented:
The Bill of Rights was designed to protect personal liberties from governmental
infringement, not to protect private individuals from each other. No personal
liberty of a victim is infringed upon by the government at any time during the
criminal prosecution. The victim has not been arrested, is not being tried, is not
in danger of being fined or imprisoned-as is the defendant-and is not being
deprived of any alternative legal remedies against a defendant. Any rights the
victim seeks to secure are not of a constitutional character. (footnote omitted).
Dolliver, supra note 7, at 91.
127. See generally Dolliver, supra note 7.
128. See supra note 126.
129. Dolliver, supra note 7, at 90 (footnote omitted). The danger involved is the
infusion of emotion into the criminal trial, which is clearly prejudicial and contradictory
to fair trial standards. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
130. For an in depth discussion of private prosecution and the evolution to public
prosecution, see Henderson, supra note 2, at 938-52. See also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
AND JUSTICE, vol. 4, at 1611-12 (S. H. Kadish ed., 1983); ROBERT ELIAS, THE POLIrCs OF
VICTIMIZATION: VICTIMS, VICTIMIOLOGY, AND HUMAN RIGiTrs (1986); STARK & GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 16, at 20-21; Abrahamson, supra note 20, at 520-21; McDonald, supra note 20,
at 649.
131. See CESARE BECCARIA, ESSAYS ON CRImES AND PUNISHMENTS 1, 74 (1764).
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All specifically guaranteed "rights" at the trial stage belong to
defendants. The only rights held by victims during trials are those
granted by the First Amendment or by state law.1 12 This is proper,
for the state has an interest in seeing that victims, as witnesses,
help the state prosecute defendants, and if victims feel alienated or
mistreated, they may not participate in the criminal justice sys-
tem.' Any legitimate interest the state has in victim participation
can be accomplished through means which do not compromise the
fairness of trials. These means include transportation to and from
the courthouse, reception at the courthouse, escort into and out of
the courthouse, a safe waiting area, counseling, child care, witness
fees, and compensation. 134 If the state interest in victim participa-
tion is met through procedures that do not violate defendants' Sixth
Amendment trial rights, then any procedure beyond these non-viola-
tive procedures would be unlikely to further serve the state's inter-
est, and would further fail the balancing test established in
Holbrook.
B. Have Victims Rights Gone Too Far?
1. Victims at the Counsel Table. The Alabama Code allows
victims to sit at the counsel table with the prosecutor.' The Court
132. For example, the Rhode Island constitution recognizes the victim, but does not
grant the victim any trial rights. The Rhode Island Constitution states:
A victim of crime shall, as a matter of right, be treated by agents of the state
with dignity, respect and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice
system. Such person shall be entitled to receive, from the perpetrator of the
crime, financial compensation for any injury or loss caused by the perpetrator of
the crime, and shall receive such other compensation as the state may provide.
Before sentencing, a victim shall have the right to address the court regarding
the impact which the perpetrator's conduct has had upon the victim.
R.I. CONST. § 23.
133. See Kelly, supra note 61; Hudson, supra note 60, at 28-34.
134. See PETER FINN & BEVERLY N.W. LEE, SERVING CRIME VICTIMS AND WITNESSES,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 3 (June 1987). See generally
NOVA DIRECTORY, supra note 3.
135. The code reads, in part:
The victim of a criminal offense shall be entitled to be present in any court exer-
cising any jurisdiction over such offense and therein to be seated at the counsel
table of any prosecutor prosecuting such offense or other attorney representing
the government or other persons in whose name such prosecution is brought.
ALA. CODE § 15-14-53 (Supp. 1992); additionally, the code reads:
A victim of a criminal offense shall not be excluded from court or counsel table
during the trial or hearing or any portion thereof conducted by any court which
in any way pertains to such offense, provided, however, a judge may remove a
victim from the trial or hearing or any portion thereof for the same causes and
in the same manner as the rules of court or law provides for the exclusion or
removal of the defendant.
ALA. CODE § 15-14-54 (Supp. 1992).
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of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, in Pierce v. State and Crowe v.
State, addressed the legality of the Code provisions providing such
victim participation and found no violation of the defendant's consti-
tutional rights. 36 However, neither decision analyzed these provi-
sions in connection with the defendant's constitutional rights;117 the
courts failed to engage in the Holbrook balancing test, which is
required when the First Amendment right of access conflicts with
the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial.
An application of this Comment's balancing test to the facts of
Pierce and Crowe compels the conclusion that the victim's presence
at the counsel table in each case was inherently prejudicial because
the presence of the victims posed an unacceptable risk that the
defendants' rights to a fair trial were compromised. Regardless of
whether a victim's presence at the counsel table is considered State
presence in the courtroom, courts have held that in-court intent to
convey a message of guilt or the infusion of emotion into the trial is
inherently prejudicial. 13 Counsel table presence is more akin to
conveying a message of guilt than it is to information dissemination
because the victim's presence can serve no purpose other than to
inject emotion into the trial. Like buttons worn by State or non-State
affiliated spectators, 3 9 the victims in Pierce and Crowe sent an
unmistakable and prejudicial statement to the jury that the
defendant was guilty.
Assuming that the victims' presence at the counsel table was
more like information dissemination than conveyance of a message,
136. See Pierce v. State, 576 So. 2d 236, (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); Crowe v. State, 485
So. 2d 351 (Ala Crim App. 1984). In Pierce, the defendant appealed from a conviction of
intentional murder during the course of a robbery. During the trial, the victim's daughter
was allowed to sit at the prosecutor's table. The court did not find this procedure violative
of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Pierce v. State, 576 So. 2d at
251. In Crowe, the defendant appealed from a conviction of capital murder of an on-duty
deputy sheriff. The victim's widow was allowed to sit at the prosecutor's table during the
trial. The court found that this procedure did not violate the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights. Crowe v. State, 485 So. 2d at 363.
137. The court in Pierce said, "[clearly, Miller had a right [because of the statute] to
be present in the courtroom and to be seated at the prosecutor's table during the trial of
the person accused of killing her mother." Pierce v. State, 576 So. 2d at 251. The court in
Crowe observed:
It is clear that Mrs. Taylor had a right to be seated at the prosecutor's table. In
view of this right and the fact that the record indicates no prejudice from the
trial court's allowing her to be present, we must agree with the trial court on
this matter. No constitutional rights of the appellant were abridged because of
this one instance.
Crowe v. State, 485 So. 2d at 363.
138. See Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990); State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d
449 (W. Va. 1985).
139. See State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449.
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but constituted state presence, this presence would still be inher-
ently prejudicial. However, courts have held that a prejudicial state
practice at trial can be justified if a compelling state interest ex-
ists. 140 No such interest existed in Pierce or Crowe. While the state
has an interest in increasing victim participation in the criminal
justice process, that interest is not necessarily compelling. Absent
" evidence to the contrary, courts should assume that the trial process
without additional victim participation represents the fairest bal-
ance of the state's interest in prosecuting criminals and the defen-
dant's interest in receiving a fair trial.
Moreover, even if the state's interest in victim participation in
Pierce and Crowe were compelling, that interest could have been
adequately served via means that were less offensive to the
Constitution. For example, the courts could have let the victim sit in
the front row of the spectators' seats, rather than at the counsel
table.
A similar outcome is reached if victim presence is not consid-
ered state presence and is deemed to fall on the information dis-
semination end of the prejudicial conduct spectrum. The Supreme
Court has held that any trial injected with public emotion or passion
is unfair." Permitting the victim to sit at the counsel table crossed
the bright line the Supreme Court has drawn separating a fair trial
from one that has been wrongfully injected with emotion and pas-
sion. Further, whatever interests the victim has in courtroom access
or expression, those interests could have been served without harm-
ing the defendant's rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury.
2. Victim/Witness Advocates. A product of the victims' rights
movement is the victim/witness advocate. An advocate is a person
who supports and informs the victim. 4 They usually work under
the umbrella of the prosecutor's office 144 and work closely with the
actual prosecutor. These advocates often accompany the victim or
victim's family into the courtroom. In certain circumstances, their
conduct in the courtroom may be prejudicial to the defendant.
140. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
141. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940).
142. See Anderson & Woodard, supra note 5, at 228.
143. New Hampshire has defined the victim/witness advocate as follows:
There is hereby established within the criminal justice bureau of the depart-
ment of justice, the office of victim/witness assistance. The office shall provide
information and services to victims and witnesses in criminal cases prosecuted
by the attorney general and shall develop and coordinate a statewide vic-
tim/witness rights information program ....
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-b (1991).
144. See, e.g., id.
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a. VictimlWitness Advocates in the Witness Box. The
Hawaii Supreme Court has held that a victim/witness advocate
"sitting with the complainant and standing behind her with her
hands on her shoulders during the complainant's testimony... bol-
stered [the] complainant's credibility." 145 This conduct had a
prejudicial effect on the jury, thus compromising the defendant's
rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury.
146
The Suka court, unlike the Pierce'47 and Crowe' courts, consid-
ered several factors. First, the court examined whether there was a
probability of prejudice in the victim/witness advocate's conduct.
The court found that the conduct "could have had the effect of
conveying to the jury... [the victim/witness advocate's] belief that
complainant was telling the truth, thereby denying the defendant
the right to a fair and impartial jury." Second, the court consid-
ered whether the victim/witness advocate's presence was necessary
to further the state's interest in the trial proceeding. The court con-
cluded that "the record does not support the conclusion that the
complainant could not testify without [the victim/witness advocate]
being present next to her."50 The presence of the victim/witness
advocate could have been upheld if there were a finding of necessity
to further the state's interest. The Suka court suggests, however,
that alternatives to accompanying a witness to the witness box
should first be explored.16'
The Suka court followed an analysis similar to the First
Amendment/Sixth Amendment balancing analysis. It found that the
state's interest must be "necessary" before it would allow this conduct." 2
The court found a probability of prejudice and weighed it against the
state's interest. 15 3 Thus, unless the state's interest outweighs the
probability of prejudice, this practice, at least in Hawaii, will be
disallowed and other conduct that is less prejudicial will be adopted.
145. State v. Suka, 777 P.2d 240, 242 (Haw. 1989). In this case, the defendant was
charged with rape. During the trial, the victim/witness advocate accompanied the
complainant, a fifteen year old girl, to the witness box and sat with the complainant dur-
ing her testimony. Id.
146. Id. at 243. The Suka court noted that the age of the victim, fifteen, was a
consideration for the court-the older the victim, the less compelling the need for a
victim/witness advocate. Id.
147. Pierce v. State, 576 So. 2d 236 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
148. Crowe v. State, 485 So. 2d 351 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
149. State v. Suka, 777 P.2d at 242 (footnote omitted).
150. Id. at 243.
151. Id. The court noted, however, that even if a finding that the victim/witness
advocate was not needed at the witness box but such a need was established elsewhere in





b. Victim/witness Advocates Escorting Every Witness for
the Prosecution Into and Out of the Courtroom. The vic-
tim/witness advocate is responsible for providing services that fulfill
victims' rights. However, there are no clear guidelines for these ad-
vocates to follow. This open-ended definition of an advocate's role
provides advocates with a great deal of discretion and latitude.'" If
the advocate's mission is to ensure that victims and witnesses are
free from intimidation and are reasonably protected from the ac-
cused, then it is possible for them to interpret their role as including
actions that help victims and witnesses at the trial (i.e., escorting
the victim into and out of the courtroom). The victim/witness advo-
cate is concerned with protecting and comforting the victim; she is
not concerned with the defendant. The judge, who controls the ac-
tions of lawyers in his courtroom, should similarly be responsible for
controlling the conduct of others-the victim, the victim's family,
and the victim/witness advocate.
In one case, every prosecution witness, from the victim to FBI
agents, forensic experts, and police officers, was escorted into the
courtroom, up to the bar, and then back out of the courtroom by a
victim/witness advocate, who also sat with the victim's family
throughout the trial.155 This practice is not acceptable under a Sixth
Amendment analysis because, as in Suka, the credibility of the
witnesses may be bolstered by the presence of an employee of the
state or of an outsider. The jury may believe that the victim/witness
advocate knows something unknown to them that has caused the
victim/witness advocate to side with the victim. Most jurors are
probably not aware that the victim/witness advocate's role is to side
with the victim. The probability of prejudice ensuing from this
practice should be found to outweigh the state interest.
The state has an interest in making witnesses feel safe, com-
fortable, and free from intimidation during their participation in the
trial. Once inside the courtroom, any fear of intimidation should
154. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-b (1991). Victim/witness advocates
could interpret their role as permitting them to protect the rights of crime victims, which
include:
(c) The right to be free from intimidation and to be reasonably protected from
the accused throughout the criminal justice process.
(e) The right to attend trial and all other court proceedings the accused has the
right to attend.
(g) The right to have inconveniences associated with participation in the crimi-
nal justice process minimized.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-k (1991).
155. The author observed these practices at the trial of State v. VandeBogart in June
and July, 1991. No. 90S-655 (Rockingham County, N.H., Super. Ct. 1991).
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disappear, because whatever intimidating presence exists in the
courtroom can be adequately controlled by the judge through judicial
order. Therefore, the state's interest in escorting witnesses into the
courtroom-protection and freedom from intimidation-are met by
means other than the use of victim/witness advocates as escorts.
156
The use of victim/witness advocates as courtroom escorts should not
be allowed because it is inherently prejudicial. 15 The state interest
has little weight in the balancing test because that interest can be
met by other, less prejudicial practices that do not interfere with the
trial.
CONCLUSION
At the trial, what participation should victims be permitted?
There is a First Amendment right to access to the courtroom.
Victims, however, are often denied this access because they are sub-
poenaed as witnesses and excluded from the courtroom when they
are not actually testifying.5 ' The right of access for a victim should
not be denied once the victim has testified and negated the basis for
his exclusion. 5 9 However, other than this fundamental First
Amendment right of access, the victim should have no greater role in
the trial. The victims' rights movement has made tremendous
progress in helping victims receive counseling and compensation
and has increased public awareness of their plight. 160 These forms of
assistance are accomplished through programs and services that
function outside of the courtroom and apart from the trial. Thus,
pushing for change inside the courtroom is inappropriate.
To avoid any chance of a miscarriage of justice, victim partici-
pation, at the trial level, should be limited to spectator access to the
156. Courtroom orders that remove intimidating forces would not violate
constitutional rights. The defendant is in no position to intimidate a witness or victim. If
he attempts to, the judge can warn him that he may be removed for disrupting the trial.
See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). The only other possible intimidating presence
would be the defendanfs family. The judge could order the family excluded from the
courtroom if they were openly hostile to witnesses, or could allow a victim/witness advo-
cate to sit with the witness to give the witness protection. If the judge decided to exclude
the defendanfs family from the courtroom, then that order would have to undergo the
First Amendment/Sixth Amendment balancing test.
157. As in Suka, the court could find that some witnesses may need an escort. The
state need would have to be great to overcome the inherent prejudice in the practice.
158. At least two states have amended their laws to provide that the exclusionary
rule does not apply to victims. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 40.385 (1987); N.H. R. EVID. 615
(1990).
159. See Karyn E. Polito, The Rights of Crime Victims in the Criminal Justice
System: Is Justice Blind to the Victims of Crime?, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM . & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 241, 251 (1990).
160. See Davis & Henley, supra note 3; Anderson & Woodard, supra note 5.
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courtroom, and nothing more. The best means for curtailing abuse is
for the judiciary to staunchly uphold defendants' trial rights by
limiting any prejudicial conduct. Although judges should consider
victims' interests, they must focus on the Constitution and remem-
ber that victims' interests do not override, or even equal, defendants'
constitutional rights.
It is important to recognize and address the plight of victims.
While defending victims' rights is easy because people see them-
selves as potential victims rather than defendants, 161 it is more diffi-
cult to recognize the movement's constitutional limitations. These
limits are delineated by the Sixth Amendment and should not be
quietly usurped by the power of a movement that few are willing to
criticize because they would be perceived as embracing criminals,
rather than as embracing the Constitution.
The victims' rights movement has validity. It should not, how-
ever, be allowed to define our Constitution through a single lens.
The courts must recognize the role of victims in the criminal justice
system, but in doing so, the courts must remember that they are
responsible for upholding the rights of all-victims and defendants.
161. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 951-52.
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